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Why Boko Haram
Will Be Here For A Looooooooong Time!
By Victoria Ibezim Ohaeri
Fri Aug 26,2011
An example :Boko Haram attack on UN House ,Abuja
It is believed in many quarters that the
Boko Haram insurgency is purely motivated by political
considerations. Local politicians, Islamic scholars and
representatives of the local and international media have
questioned the roles played by the different political parties
and religious leaders in the state. For instance, key
traditional and religious leaders in Bornu state have not been
vocal in condemning the activities of the Boko Haram sect
despite the several attacks and killings of private citizens,
security officials and Christians. A veteran journalist working
with an international media agency, Mr. Ibrahim Mshelliza also
noted that members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party in the State
have never openly condemned the Boko Haram menace and views the
attacks as a calculated attempt to undermine the leadership of
the All Nigeria’s Peoples’ Party in Bornu.
Another school of thought has it that the
Boko Haram insurgency intensified and became deadlier than ever
following the refusal of President Goodluck Jonathan to respect
the zoning arrangement of the Peoples’ Democratic Party. As
such, the perpetrators of the current insecurity has long ago,
planned and arranged how to thoroughly make the country
ungovernable should he eventually mount the saddle of leadership
post April 2011 in Nigeria. As has been succinctly put[1]:
For example, there can be no doubt that the
Boko Haram issue and the post election violence in the North are
clearly reactions to perceived or real loss of power by an elite
stratum that is predominantly “Northern” and also “Moslem” even
if the leading figures in this agenda do not necessarily count
religious piety among their greatest attributes. What is
happening in my view is a contest over raw political power: who
lost power, who won power, and who wants power back. The
processes that threw up President Goodluck Jonathan as the
candidate of this elite stratum were intimately bound up with
the political crisis that has gripped the ‘northern’ political
class.
For a political ‘north’, which has always
been in position of power and authority, the idea of getting
used to ‘powerlessness’ poses a huge challenge. This is a crisis
for power brokers and beneficiaries of power in the north. And
one of the ways in which the Boko Haram is being interpreted is
the service it offers such power deprived elite stratum to play
cynical politics without alienating themselves from their
communities. Linked to this of course is the contest between the
conservative traditional authority and a more progressive
successor generation in the North. There is clearly a breakdown
in this traditional authority in the north where it used to be
very strong in the country. Young, dynamic and street smart
politicians are edging out the old (a common phenomenon all over
the country) but they are yet to consolidate their grip on power
and Islamic radicalism offers a strong incentive on that
consolidation agenda.
However, some public analysts[2]
have argued that although members of the group may have been
hijacked and used by politicians to achieve some mischievous
political objectives, that does not take away the ultimate
agitations of the group for an Islamic State. The political
underpinnings that belie the conflict have spurred a significant
erosion of political will and public confidence in the
authorities to deal with the situation fairly and squarely.
External offers of technical support and
assistance in quelling the crisis has been largely insincere and
cosmetic. Whilst the international community says it supports
non-violence, the actions that are taken by western governments,
international governing bodies and the media are, most times,
contradictory. Little is being done to allow non-violent action
to succeed and the media continues to sensationalize violent
conflict and ignore peaceful interaction. Few weeks ago, many
Nigerian newspapers screamed with the headline news of the
arrival of Jack Bauer in keeping with the United States’ offer
of military assistance to check the security situation in
Maiduguri. It would appear from this US government perspective
that the situation is viewed as a purely security issue
requiring military response, not a theatre of social and
economic deprivations and injustices requiring training in
dialogue and conflict resolution strategies.
Both the Boko Haram on one side, the
Nigerian Police and the army on the other side are equally yoked
in the gory killings and myriad of security challenges facing
the state. Their clashes have left hundreds dead on both sides.
There is no doubt that security operatives comprising mainly the
police and soldiers have been the main targets of violent
attacks by the Boko Haram sect. Beginning from July 1999 when
Boko Haram insurgency gained prominence in Bornu State, more
than seventy junior and senior officers of the Nigerian Police
Force have been murdered in cold blood by Boko Haram insurgents.
Most of these personnel were killed when they were off duty as
they returned to their homes at close of work or on their way to
work.
To cap it all, the June 16, 2011 attack on
Louis Edet House, the headquarters of the Nigeria Police Force
which claimed lives and destroyed no fewer than 70 vehicles left
many Nigerians in utter shock and bewilderment. As condemnable
as these Boko Haram killings are, the extra judicial execution
of the sect’s members have even been more horrifying. No single
event symbolizes police impunity and extrajudicial execution of
Boko Haram members than the killing of Alhaji Buji Foi (a
two-time chairman of Kaga Local Government Area and former
commissioners of Religious Affairs and Water Resources; Alhaji
Mohammed Baba Fugu and late sect leader, Mohammed Yusufu at the
Police headquarters in Maiduguri. Yusuf’s murder is believed to
be in revenge for the killing of the deputy to the squadron
commander, a superintendent of police and many police officers
in July 2009[3].
The ongoing ‘an-eye-for-eye” tactic continues to stand in the
way of meaningful progress and engagement between the warring
factions.
Perhaps, most telling is that absolute
mistrust, suspicion, and fear characterize the relationship
between the security operatives and the civilian populations
undermining intelligence undertakings that would lead to the
definite identification and extirpation of the sect’s members
and activities. Areas lived by the poor are often criminalized
and labeled as Boko Haram hideouts to justify the extreme
security surveillance and violent incursions by soldiers. Often,
these incursions are accompanied by severe violence, with
victims on many occasions arrested, detained and in some cases,
killed. No members of the JTF are known to have been held
accountable for committing gross human rights violations
including torture and extrajudicial executions.
Based on the sentiments shared by several
persons interviewed in the informal neighbourhoods, it is
obvious that the greater the force employed by the JTF in the
areas designated as military targets, the greater the sympathy
those affected communities have for the Boko Haram sect, to the
extent that majority of them are hesitant or outrightly
unwilling to provide information to the police on the hideouts
and activities of the sect members. These responses reinforce
perceptions of the local people that government is against them,
and closes the gap between genuine community agitations and
criminal activities.
The mixture of impunity, the lack of
accountability, dearth of political will, corruption, and abuse
by politicians as great barriers preventing any meaningful
solution to the growing violent situation in Maiduguri in
particular, and Nigeria in general. The signature failure of the
Nigerian authorities to address the legacy of past human rights
violations by both military forces and ethnic insurgents offers
little hope that such violations will not be repeated and
prevents victims and survivors from reconciling and rebuilding
their lives. Two years after the first violent outbreak of the
Boko Haram crisis in Maiduguri, family members of hundreds of
victims of the killings and destruction unleashed by Boko Haram
members, as well as victims of extrajudicial killing by security
forces have continued to cry for justice without reprieve.
Any credible peace process must involve all
parties to the conflict, including representatives of the
government, the poor communities of the northern Nigeria,
members of the Boko Haram sect, religious leaders in the region
and victims of the attacks. A framework for discussion, a forum
for articulating grievances, and a well-developed agenda are all
needed to begin a negotiation process that will lead to a
comprehensive solution of the relevant political, economic and
security problems.
Excerpts from the report, In the Killing
Fields of Maiduguri.....
by Victoria Ibezim Ohaeri
[1] Resurgent
Regionalism and Democratic Development in Western Nigeria:
Challenges and Prospects at page 5
[2] Interview with
Mr. Ibrahim Mshelizza, Senior Reporter, Reuters Agency July 25,
2011
[3] The
insurrections took place between July 26 to 29, 2009.
Note :Article culled from spacesforchange.blogspot.com,
above picture by NAN,inserted by newsdiaryonline
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