By Comrade Abiodun Aremu to the Constitution Review Consultative Conference held at
Lagos Airport Hotel, Tuesday, October 7, 2008
The topic I was asked to address was “Exploring Constitution Review as an entry
point for Political Reform in Nigeria :
Engagement strategies and Tasks before the Nigerian stakeholders”. I crave the
indulgence of the organizers to amend the
topic for three reasons. First, the lessons from Nigeria political history suggest
that the making of past constitutions
(exception of 1999) emerged as a product of negotiated political conferences between
the government of the ruling cabals
(colonial and neo-colonial rulers) and the political parties and formations of the other
aspiring rulers-elites. It is not
the other way round as was suggested by the given topic. Secondly, the term Nigerian
stakeholders is ambiguous because of
its assemblage of all shades of characters, comprising the looters and their agents; opportunists in
the midst of the advocates who flirts with those in government that are opposed to the agenda;
and those mostly in the CSOs
whose efforts are geared towards satisfying their selfish interests, and the expectation of donors’
funded projects. Thirdly,
the organizers appear to me to be contented with the present “cash and carry” approach to
constitution review, and they need
be reminded that the name
PRONACO (i.e. pro-national conference organizations) derived from the inaugural goal of political
restructuring through the
medium of Sovereign National Conference(SNC). Thus, my presentation is on “Strategies and Tasks
for Constitution Making in
Nigeria”. If PRONACO were not to lose or shy away from its original agenda, it should not be
seen to be organizing programme
for programme sake. The current approaches so far undertaken appear to me to suggest tinkering with
Constitution. At several recent seminars by the CSOs, some voices have argued
forcefully on the urgent necessity to amend Section 9 of 1999 Constitution, which
they identified as critical to
opening the door to constitution review. I am not in
the least persuaded by this defeatist and patronizing argument. It should be clear
to the proponents of the piecemeal amendments that the cabals who hold the key to a
forcefully occupied territory would open such door on the condition of how much
appeasement it is willing to accept.
However, my presentation is merely to offer insights that could assist the
organizers to understand the limitations of the current “weak” approach to
constitution review and suggestions on how to proceed henceforth.
Which People’s Constitution?
Variously, the word “the people” has been so much abused, and all manners of infamy
and treacheries are committed in the guise of the people. Democracy (otherwise known
as constitutional governance) in particular, laid emphasis on “the people”, i.e.
government of the people by the people for the people. The 1999 Constitution is on
“we the people”; and the various constitutional drafts by CSOs also made no pretence
on laying claims to be representing “the people”.
It is important to know which people are the efforts at constitutional review in
Nigeria geared towards. The looters and plunderers of the human and material
resources in pre and post independence Nigeria also claimed to belong to the
categories of Nigerians or ethnic differentiations. For clarity on the Nigerian
people I refer to, I would recommend the definition by Fidel Castro, which provides
the best appreciation of “the people” in his “History Will Absolve Me”. He stated:
“When we speak of the people we are not talking about those who live in comfort, the
conservative elements of the nation, who welcome any repressive regime, any
dictatorship, any despotism, prostrating themselves before the masters of the moment
until they grind their foreheads into the ground. When we speak of struggle and we
mention the people we mean the vast unredeemed masses, those to whom everyone makes
promises and who are deceived by all; we mean the people who
yearn for a better, more dignified and more just nation; who are moved by ancestral
aspirations to justice, for they have suffered injustice and mockery generation
after generation; those who long for great and wise changes in all aspects of their
life; people who, to attain those changes, are ready to give even the very last
breadth they have when they believe in something or in someone, especially when
they believe in themselves”.
Constitution reform may succeed technically by tinkering with certain
inconsequential provisions (for the sake of amendments), and yet the mass of the
people so-grouped ethnic nation-states are victims of the emergent new ruling
cabals/exploiters/looters. This is what I call devolution of powers among looters.
Thus, the goal of constitution making, in the least should be social change, which
would give powers of access of resources, distribution and consumption to “the
The Contexts of Constitutional Making in Nigeria
i. In pre-independence, constitution making and reviews were
championed by political parties (NCNC, AG, NPC, NEPU, NIP, KNC, etc.) representing
regional and parties’ interests being the dominant voice, having assisted the
colonial authority to undermined the social movement of Labour, Zikist Movement, and
other leading voices in the liberation struggle for the socialist transformation of
ii. In post-independence civilian rule, ruling political parties
formulated the Republic and regional constitutions in line with their defined
iii. In military and post military era (1966 to date) – two lines
emerged. The line of constituent assembly/constitutional conference preceded the
promulgation of the military-politicians authored 1979, 89, and 1999 Constitutions.
The second line is the overt and covert control of the review process by the
military dynasty of IBB, Abacha and OBJ in view of their mad obsession for life
presidency. The National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) of OBJ, and the Abacha
Constitutional Conference were testimonies of such line.
iv. The PRONACO document poses itself as an alternative
constitutional arrangement which cannot be accommodated by the present power
structure. If it is to be implemented to the letter, it has to adopt the strategy
that should ensure that the status quo would not be able to rule on its own terms
but accede to a negotiation on the basis of a dual power situation. Can the elements
in PRONACO bring about such a dual power arrangement? The question is left to them
to ponder with. The lesson from the collapse of the 1960s regional constitutions is
that at every point of advancement or reversal, the constitution has to be
negotiated and re-negotiated on the basis of the balance of powers. The stalemate of
the NPRC by the Obasanjo dictatorship was a recent example of how every question in
a constitutional review has to be negotiated politically.
v. The ongoing review process is driven by a loose and weak
amalgam of forces drawn largely from CSOs, who are operating from a position of
disadvantage. Thus, unlike in the past, the present context lacks a political
vi. Another major limitation of the current approach is the search
for models of what is operative in Ghana , South Africa , America , Europe, etc;
without recourse to understanding how those “models” emerged from their specific
historical realities, completely different from Nigeria .
vii. The State of Nigeria is akin to a village that was invaded and
presided over by bandits and looters who dictate the terms on which they rule the
conquered villagers. The villagers have choices - Is it to wake up the people or
succumb to the rule of the ruling cabals?
viii. Who is constitutional review supposed to free – the material
resources or the people (human resources)? If it is to free the people from bondage,
then the strategy for mobilization should link technicalities or legalities with
political and economic desires of the people. How much access has the people to
education, health, mortgage (to fund housing, mobility, etc), i.e. basically human
capital development is crucial?
ix. Nigeria is not working not merely because of geo-political or
ethnic divisiveness, but majorly because of the masters-servants’ socio-economic
formation which allocate resources as a Father Christmas. The ruling parasites are
extremely cruel and are not willing to let go the privileges and powers acquired
over time. Histories have shown that even as separate nation-states, sub-ethnic
consciousness and conflicts always emerge to destroy the supposedly unity, which
would require not a mere ethnic solution, but more of a unifying factor in the
Constitution making is more of political and legitimate questions than the
legalistic and bogus “rule of law”. Even the ruling elites never make pretence about
this. For instance, the Electoral Reform Panel (ERP) hurried contraption by Yar’Adua
was a political and legitimacy begging carrot to curry public sympathy and blackmail
the judiciary for a biased and so-called political judgment in favour of the regime.
Two instances suffice here of the futility of the ERP - the incident of June 25,
2008 by the UAD in the gallery against the leadership of the Panel for its double
standards and selective intimidation of critical voices and patronage of pro-ruling
PDP views. The second is the news making the grapevine of the ERP’s secret
visitations to the IBBs and OBJs’ as “stakeholders” in the reform process.
Therefore, in fashioning out appropriate strategy, every issue must be discussed. A
48 years’ old country that has repeatedly failed exams in the quest for nationhood
must first admit its failure to appreciate the imperative necessity for reform or
change. At this stage, it is important to recall my submission five years ago on the
critique of the CSOs weak approach to negotiation.
We are always in a rush to be trapped. For instance, I argued in November 2006 at
the 2nd NSF that: “Are we really negotiating or winning? We have failed in that
direction so far because negotiation implies some compromises and when in 1998/99 we
negotiated from the position of weakness, we are now the losers. From the benefit of
hindsight, if our non-participation in the General Abdulsalam Abubakar transition to
civilian rule had been anchored on insisting in the making of a process-led
constitution before the 1998/99 elections, probably by now, we would have made some
advances in the direction of democracy. The lesson is that in a new transition
arrangement in future, we must have fundamental issues on which to negotiate. It
must be clear that the conditionality on which a process is negotiated ultimately
determine the context of governance and the problems it would concern itself with”.
At least, the registration of AD that could not meet the INEC
requirements suffices here because the regime had to appease the party floated by
“I also queried at that forum: Why has it been impossible for the opposition parties
to insist on an agenda of a democratic constitution, which I believe is a germane
document to found democratic governance if that is even our desire? And am still
sustained by the conclusion then: “I have faint hope that democracy may be possible
in Nigeria and am not sure the present civilian arrangement provides any basis on
which to build or consolidate any constitutional rule. I disagree with those who
think we are just beginning as a nation and providing flimsy excuses for our
somersaulting after 46 years of independence. How we measure success or failure is
also important. Failure or success is a gradual process. Africa ’s experiences under
slave trade and colonialism took about 450 years. 50 years of neo-colonial
independence in the life of a people is not a joke. Thus, the agenda of neo-liberal
economy, phony anti-graft war and pseudo strengthening of the
institutions of democracy are the interventions that were concluded by the Nigeria
political clique and the foreign influences in negotiating the current transition”.
The LCM Approach is Critical to the Start
This is the lowest common multiple that affords all those on the alternative side to
arrive at a minimum acceptable negotiating list. It should first and foremost
absolve itself from the mindset of amendments on the terms dictated by the status
Before adopting the LCM approach, the objectives of the constitution making must be
clearly defined by resolving the following questions:
- Is the objective the mere legalistic removal of Section 9 and piecemeal
- What are the values of the constitution vis a vis the legal fraud
called non-justiceable provisions?
- Will the reform guarantee improved access to enjoyment of basic rights,
popular participation, and respect of the aspirations of the governed?
The approach entails that:
- Each group needs to independently review the documents by others, and
come to terms with how much concession it is willing to afford in the harmonization?
- Committee meetings’ to harmonise areas of common agreements.
- There should be Report back for adoption of the Common Agreements.
- All the groups should speak as a voice to the Common Agreements.
i. Need medium and long term strategies.
ii. Intensive advocacy and comprehensive strategies at all stages.
iii. Influencing public opinions, national assembly, public
iv. Documents and information on it be widely circulated through
all forms – email, adverts, regular media briefing, handbills (executive summary).
v. Capacity of the groups in favour of constitutional reform viz.
legislative, advocacy, and institutional.
vi. The Ethnic Factor in mobilization – the Jakande-Jafojo and
Ige-Afolabi tickets broke ethnic, rotational and religious divisiveness and
barriers, and were founded on sound collective and social endeavour of their party’s
manifesto on social welfare programmes. Hence, the attractive appeal of ethnicity as
a mobilizing framework for people of the same ancestral origin should be seen as a
compliment of the socio-economic variables, and not the other way round.
vii. Alternative agenda rest in heavy investment on the rebuilding of
the social movement to recover its traditions of independence, vibrancy, and
self-motivation; and to avoid the charade of paying the “rent-a-crowd”. All cultural
ingredients (music, drama, town meetings, social clubs, harvest festivals, etc)
should be mobilized in such ways that farmers, students, professionals, etc can in
their own specific realities internalize their desires in the constitution.
viii. Building the “disciples theory” from among and to work among the
women, fishermen, farmers, traders, militants, social forces, etc.
ix. Need to train organizers and mobilisers in the art of popular
x. The leadership question need be resolved not as in ethnic
leader, but in favour of a broad minded, and non-sectarian. This is because as
identified above that there exist sub and micro ethnic consciousness and already
corroborated by the factionalisation in the various ethnic groups, which can be
exploited divisively and appealed to by the ruling cabals to break the fragile
ethnic solidarity. For instance, the Yoruba agenda is not only isolationist but
egocentric, and imperialistic and can never really (beyond the media show) mobilize
the ordinary Yoruba in Kwara and Kogi States .
xi. Must have strategy to contain the rapacious plots by the local
and international ruling cabals to split the unified movement. What is required is a
strategy driven by a consistent ideological campaign among the people and against
the status quo. We need a social movement that should link the economic desires of
the people to politics. Past regimes doctored by the ruling dynasty have consciously
through stick and carrot approaches weakened and destroyed the social movement. 
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