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TO understand the Jonathan Presidency, we
must return to its roots in the Yar’Adua era
and trace developments therefrom. The
Yar’Adua presidency at its inception
announced a seven-point agenda, focusing on
key issues of power and energy, Niger Delta,
land reform, national security, wealth
creation and employment, transportation, and
food security and agriculture. The objective
according to the then President was to
reduce poverty in a country where more than
70% of the 150 million population lives
below the poverty line, on less than a
dollar per day, ensure peace in the troubled
Niger Delta region, achieve the UN
Millennium Development Goals, and fast-track
the country’s development process. President
Yar’Adua in a remarkable show of candour
also admitted publicly that the 2007
elections which brought him and others to
power was indeed flawed and that there was
an urgent need for electoral reform to which
his administration was committed. This
raised a critical question of legitimacy but
whereas Nigerians may have been suspicious
of the PDP’s performance in the 2007
elections, they seemed willing to give the
new administration a chance.
It was the first time since 1960 that two
university graduates would take charge of
the reins of power at the top. This in a
way underscored the importance Nigerians
attach to education, but the output from the
administration would end up a telling
comment on Nigerian university education.
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua had a Master’s
degree in Analytical Chemistry, he had
worked as a college teacher, and in his
early days, he had been a fire-brand
Marxist, one of the radicals from the North
despite the aristocracy of his pedigree. He
had also served in Katsina state as Governor
for eight years. He was 56. His Vice
President, Goodluck Jonathan, 50, had a
Ph.D, had also been a college teacher,
worked in a development agency, and served
as Deputy Governor and Governor. The duo may
not have been the best leadership materials
that the country could have at the time but
it was assumed in many quarters that they
would understand the issues at stake and go
to work in the public interest.
The first signs of trouble had occurred long
before Yar’Adua took office, but more
trouble became evident when the
administration could not put a cabinet
together on time, and when it did, it was an
uninspiring team, many of whose members were
meeting the President for the first time.
The new Federal Government also displayed
much indecisiveness as it found itself in a
difficult situation whereby early policy
decisions were soon reversed and so much
intra-governmental dissonance was
advertised. The most celebrated in the
latter regard was the announcement of a
redenomination of the Naira policy by the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which the
Presidency claimed it had no knowledge of,
and which it ordered Charles Soludo, then
CBN Governor to reverse; his complaints that
he was backed by the CBN Act
notwithstanding. Senior government officials
routinely contradicted each other, showing a
seeming lack of direction.
One of the arguments that the Obasanjo team
had put forward in the lead up to the 2007
elections was that the Yar-Adua-Jonathan
ticket would be in Nigeria’s interest,
because it would be a government of
continuity; and that the foundations that
had been laid by the Obasanjo administration
would yield bountiful fruits under Yar’Adua.
This did not happen. One of the first things
the Yar’Adua government did as it settled
down was to distance itself from the
Obasanjo legacy. The so-called Obasanjo boys
who had expected to be rewarded for their
contributions to the Yar’Adua campaign were
marginalized and replaced with a Katsina
mafia which surrounded the new President,
that Mafia would soon assume the title of a
cabal before the end of the Yar’Adua
Presidency. Jonathan was an outsider to that
group.
In due course, President Yar’Adua settled
down fully in office. Some of the highlights
of his administration included the launch of
an amnesty programme in the Niger Delta
which served the purpose of helping to
reduce the national security crisis in that
region, albeit poorly conceived. The
President also set up a committee on the
power sector with a promise that he would
declare a state of emergency in that sector.
The country’s power supply crisis was
already almost an intractable problem with
many companies relocating from Nigeria on
that account. The emergency that was
promised was never declared.
However, in a speech he delivered on May 29,
2009, to mark Nigeria’s Democracy Day,
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua offered his
mid-term report and gave himself a pass
mark: He said among other things that his
administration had made tremendous impact in
the country’s agricultural sector in two
years, by constructing five agro-export
conditioning centres and 10 rice processing
centres. He claimed also that his government
had increased irrigated land from 4,000
hectares in 1999 to 150, 00 hectares, and a
N200 billion long-term concessionary loan
had been instituted for large-scale farmers.
?
He cited the Niger Delta as a region
where “our agenda for the resolution of the
developmental problems of the region” was
being successfully implemented. In addition
to a Niger Delta amnesty programme, his
government had also created a Federal
Ministry for the Niger Delta, saddled with
the task of providing infrastructure and
employment. He added: “We also have
retained the Niger Delta Development
Commission as a Federal Government
intervention agency and ensured that its
statutory allocations are paid in
full…Knowing that these efforts and other
developmental efforts will be ineffectual if
there is no peace in the region, we are
taking necessary steps to ensure greater
security in the area…Our offer of amnesty to
militants in the region who lay down their
arms remains on the table.”
The speech also referred to the Petroleum
Industry Bill which the Executive had
submitted to the National Assembly for
consideration; which when passed into law
should result in far-reaching reforms in the
extractive sector which accounts for 99% of
the country’s foreign exchange earnings.
This was to be complemented by a
restructuring of the downstream sector for
greater efficiency and transparency in
addition to self-sufficiency in domestic
petroleum refining.
The administration by May 2009, had also
submitted to the National Assembly seven
bills on electoral reform, sequel to the
establishment of the National Electoral
Reform Commission led by Justice Muhammadu
Uwais, and the consideration of that
Commission’s report. Yar’Adua further
promised Nigerians a target of 6, 000
megawatts of electricity by December 2009.
He said: “I am pleased to report that we
have taken concrete steps towards meeting
this target and achieving 10,000 MW by early
2011.”
“We have also provided US$ 1.5 billion for
investment in gas network infrastructure
which will, among other things, ensure the
adequate supply of gas to our thermal
stations.” His administration according to
him, had also awarded contracts for the
rehabilitation of 34 Federal Highways across
the country at a cost of about N140 billion
in addition to completing 13 major highways
inherited from the previous administration.”
This was the last major report President
Umaru Yar’Adua presented to Nigerians before
his death a year later, possibly one of his
last public appearances before October 1,
2009. Positive as the report sounded, very
few Nigerians were impressed. The Yar’Adua
Presidency was widely considered to be
rather slow and ineffective, so much that
the President was given the sobriquet -
“Baba Go Slow”. Many of the achievements he
claimed raised more concerns. The Federal
Ministry of the Niger Delta was another
bureaucracy, with the appointed Minister
Ufot Ekaette embarking on a wasteful
familiarization tour of the region, even
when he is from that same part of the
country.
The so-called amnesty programme by 2009 was
already failing with no hope of sustainable
peace in the Niger Delta. Both the
Presidency and the National Assembly had
played so much needless politics with
electoral reform and the report of the Uwais
Commission, that the seven bills submitted
to the National Assembly made complete
short-shrift of the core recommendations of
the Commission on the independence of the
Electoral Commission, its funding, and the
system of elections. More than 140 billion
had been spent on roads, but across the
country the state of public infrastructure
remained deplorable. Till date the
disbursement of the N20 billion agric fund
is a subject of official mystery.
For two years, the government could not
address the crisis of electricity supply in
the country, and whereas there was so much
to be done in terms of development projects,
every December, Ministries, Departments and
Agencies (MDAs) ended up returning money to
the treasury simply because they had not
done anything in the course of the year. In
2008, there was the celebrated scandal of
such monies being shared by Federal Ministry
of Health officials in collusion with
members of the Senate! There were also many
untidy developments: the removal of Nuhu
Ribadu as Chairman of the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the
attendant politicking which gave the
impression that the Yar’Adua administration
was not so committed after all to the fight
against corruption. There were also
allegations of a re-Northernization of the
Federal Government, particularly of key
government departments.
But the bigger source of concern was the
failing health of President Yar’Adua. This
had been a major issue during the
Presidential campaigns of 2007, with persons
who knew him reporting that the only reason
Katsina state under his watch as Governor
did not spend so much money was because the
Governor was on sick bed most of the time.
Nevertheless, he won the election and became
President because he was the man that former
President Olusegun Obasanjo wanted and whom
he swore would succeed him. It did not take
long before Nigerians knew the truth: they
were saddled with a sick President. There
were reports of Federal Executive Council
meetings being cancelled because the
President was indisposed. He also travelled
abroad frequently for medical treatment,
first to Germany and later Saudi Arabia. He
was Chairman of ECOWAS, but he missed many
of its meetings, and also important UN
engagements.
The Nigerian press was largely sympathetic
however. Yar’Adua’s illness provided a
perfect alibi for the slowness of his
administration at a great cost to Nigeria.
The poser then was: if he had a Deputy who
was healthy, why could he not delegate most
of his functions, and allow the country to
move on while he sought medical help? In
Nigeria, processes and traditions that work
elsewhere are rarely respected. Since 1999,
there has been at both Federal and state
levels, a crisis of relationships between
substantive political figures and their
Deputies (Governor/Deputy Governor,
President/Vice President).
When Governors travelled, they often did so
with their entire cabinets including the
Deputy Governor, leaving the state in the
care of either the Head of Service or the
Speaker of the Assembly, or whoever would
not pose a threat to the Governor. Before
the end of their tenure in 2007, President
Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku
Abubakar were sworn enemies. The 1999
Constitution assigns no specific role to
Deputy Governors or the Vice President,
placing the occupiers of such positions at
the mercy of their bosses. The oft-stated
consensus among Nigerians is that these are
“spare tyre” positions. Ambitious Deputies
readily found themselves in the line of
fire; various stakeholders have learnt to
defer only to the man in power, who also
does not usually leave anyone in doubt about
the scope of his authority.
President Yar’Adua may have been ill, but he
was assertive. He left no one in doubt that
it was his Presidency and that he was in
charge of it. There was never at any time
any public display of disaffection between
him and his Deputy but Dr Goodluck Jonathan
wielded no extraordinary influence. Members
of the Katsina Mafia inside the Presidency
were reportedly far more powerful. Aides of
the Vice President complained about how
their boss’s office was cash-strapped. The
Vice President did not even live in the
official residence of the Vice president. He
was quartered in a Presidential Guest House.
It was not until January 2010 that the
Federal Executive Council hurriedly and most
conveniently approved a sum of N7 billion
for the design and construction of a
befitting residence for the Vice President.
Adamu Aliero, then Minister of the Federal
Capital Territory said: “The vice president
is staying in a guest house meant for
visiting heads of state. It is not right. It
is not befitting for the vice president…It
is unbecoming for the vice president to stay
in a guest house…” This was nearly three
years after Jonathan became Vice President!
Members of the Ijaw Monitoring Group (IMG)
had in fact complained before then that not
enough security was being provided for the
Vice President. The BBC has described
Jonathan as a “low-key deputy to a low-key
President” and that if his Vice Presidency
was distinguished at all, it was only in
terms of the role he played in the
negotiations with Niger Delta militants, his
own kinsmen. Jonathan, as in Bayelsa, again
played the role of a loyal Deputy: he was
not a threat to his boss. But his age of
innocence ended in November 2009 with
developments that thrust him closer to the
big job, and serious lessons for Nigeria.
To be continued...
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